By: Edward Dictionary Caulker
Following Parliament’s passage of the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill, 2025, the All People’s Congress (APC) has formally outlined its opposition through a detailed five-point response. In a strongly worded statement signed by National Secretary General Lansana Dumbuya Esq., the party rejected the process that led to passage of the Bill, described it as unconstitutional, and announced a series of legal, political, and civic actions intended to challenge both the Speaker’s ruling and Parliament’s decision.
A “legislative heist” is how APC characterises what transpired. Yet beyond political language lies a more important reality: Sierra Leone is now confronted with a constitutional debate that reaches far beyond party interests.
At stake are questions concerning parliamentary procedure, constitutional interpretation, judicial authority, legislative limits, and democratic legitimacy.
More fundamentally, debate centres on one question: Did Parliament apply the correct constitutional threshold in passing the amendment Bill?
APC’s objection is rooted primarily in Section 108(2)(b) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991.
According to the party’s interpretation, any Bill seeking to amend the Constitution must secure support from not less than two-thirds of Members of Parliament during both its Second and Third Readings.
With Parliament comprising 149 Members, including Paramount Chief Members, APC argues that constitutional approval required 100 votes.
Since reports indicate that 96 votes were secured, the party maintains that constitutional requirements were not satisfied.
As revealed by, APC rejects interpretation adopted by Speaker Segepoh Solomon Thomas, who ruled that Parliament could proceed under provisions contained in Section 91(1).
That section states:
“Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, any question proposed for decision in Parliament shall be determined by a majority of the votes of the Members present and voting.”
As it happens, the phrase “except as otherwise provided in this Constitution” carries significant weight. In its view, Section 108 provides precisely such an exception and therefore overrides general majority voting provisions established under Section 91(1).
This disagreement forms foundation of the current constitutional controversy.
Why Section 108 Matters?
Beyond legal technicalities, Section 108 occupies a special place within constitutional governance.
Constitutions differ from ordinary laws because they establish rules by which governments operate. They define powers, responsibilities, rights, and institutional boundaries.
For that reason, constitutional amendments often require higher thresholds than ordinary legislation.
Such safeguards are designed to prevent fundamental constitutional changes from being made too easily or without broad consensus.
APC therefore argues that interpreting Section 108 narrowly risks weakening protections intended to preserve constitutional stability.
From its perspective, issue extends beyond a single amendment Bill and touches on broader principles governing future constitutional reform.
Nevertheless, Speaker Thomas reached a different conclusion.
In his ruling, he invited Parliament and citizens to consider relationship between Sections 91(1) and 108 as part of a wider constitutional framework rather than as isolated provisions.
His argument rests on distinction between entrenched and non-entrenched constitutional provisions.
According to his interpretation, Section 108 specifically governs amendments affecting entrenched provisions identified within that section. Amendments relating to non-entrenched provisions, however, may proceed through ordinary parliamentary voting mechanisms established under Section 91(1).
On that basis, Speaker ruled that Constitution Amendment Bill, 2025 could be determined through a simple majority vote.
Importantly, ruling did not dismiss constitutional concerns raised by opposition Members. Instead, it acknowledged that genuine constitutional questions existed.
That acknowledgement would later become one of the most significant elements of the ruling itself.
Perhaps most notably, Speaker Thomas referred a constitutional question to the Supreme Court.
In concluding his ruling, he stated:
“However, since the question whether or not a non-entrenched Constitutional provision can be altered by recourse only to Section 91(1) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991, (Act No. 6 of 1991) is of grave public interest, I refer this question to the Supreme Court for an opinion to be referred to this House not later than three months today to guide future discussions on this matter.”
That referral is significant for several reasons.
First, it recognises that constitutional interpretation remains contested.
Second, it acknowledges public interest surrounding amendment procedures.
Third, it invites judicial guidance on a matter that could shape future constitutional reforms.
At the same time, Speaker did not suspend proceedings pending judicial opinion. Parliament continued with consideration of the Bill while constitutional questions were referred for future clarification.
From APC’s perspective, however, referral itself demonstrates that matter remains unsettled and therefore warrants judicial examination before further action proceeds.
Beyond numerical calculations and procedural disagreements lies a broader constitutional principle advanced by APC.
According to its argument, where a specific constitutional provision exists, it must prevail over a general one.
This principle is not unique to Sierra Leone. Courts across many jurisdictions routinely distinguish between specific provisions and broader provisions when resolving legal disputes.
APC therefore contends that reliance on Section 91(1) cannot lawfully displace requirements contained in Section 108 if Section 108 specifically addresses constitutional amendments.
Furthermore, APC argues that neither Standing Order 42 nor Section 94(2) can be used to validate actions that conflict with constitutional requirements.
Whether that position ultimately prevails remains a question for judicial interpretation rather than political declaration.
Against this backdrop, APC outlined five specific demands.
First, it rejects and condemns passage of Constitution Amendment Bill, 2025, describing it as unconstitutional and legally void.
Second, it commits itself to pursuing legal redress before Supreme Court.
Third, it asserts principle of popular sovereignty, arguing that Constitution belongs to citizens rather than any branch of government.
Fourth, it calls on civil society organisations, religious leaders, citizens, and international partners to reject what it describes as constitutional theft.
Fifth, it demands suspension of further action on the Bill until Supreme Court determines constitutional questions arising from proceedings.
Taken together, these measures reveal a strategy built around judicial review, constitutional advocacy, public mobilisation, and political accountability.
In addition to constitutional objections, APC’s statement raises allegations that opposition Members of Parliament were offered financial inducements to support the amendment Bill.
Such allegations are serious and, if proven, would raise significant concerns regarding integrity of legislative processes.
However, responsible analysis requires a clear distinction between allegation and established fact.
At present, allegations have been made publicly. No court, investigative institution, or independent body has verified them.
Therefore, while existence of allegations forms part of current political controversy, their validity remains unproven.
Maintaining that distinction is essential if public discourse is to remain grounded in evidence rather than assumption.
At its core lies a broader question about how constitutional change should occur within a democratic society.
APC fears that permitting constitutional amendments through a simple majority could create a precedent capable of affecting future reforms.
Supporters of Parliament’s position argue that constitutional provisions must be interpreted according to their text and structure.
Critics contend that constitutional safeguards should always receive a broader and more protective interpretation.
Both perspectives ultimately point toward a common concern: preservation of constitutional legitimacy.
Regardless of political affiliation, citizens have a vested interest in ensuring that constitutional change occurs through processes that command public confidence.
Political arguments will continue.
However, next decisive phase is likely to unfold within legal institutions rather than political arenas.
Should APC proceed with a formal challenge, Supreme Court may eventually be called upon to clarify relationship between Sections 91(1) and 108, determine applicable voting thresholds, and assess constitutional validity of Parliament’s actions.
Its interpretation could shape future constitutional reforms for years to come.
Until then, competing legal and political interpretations will continue to dominate public debate.
APC’s statement is more than a political protest.
It represents a constitutional challenge built around a specific legal interpretation, a proposed judicial remedy, and broader concerns regarding democratic safeguards.
Whether one agrees with APC’s position or supports Speaker’s interpretation, questions raised are sufficiently serious to warrant careful constitutional examination.
Ultimately, issue extends beyond fate of Constitution Amendment Bill, 2025.
More fundamentally, it concerns how Sierra Leone interprets its supreme law, how constitutional disagreements are resolved, and which institutions possess final authority in determining constitutional compliance.
Parliament has spoken.
Opposition has objected.
Speaker has ruled.
Judiciary may soon be called upon to provide clarity.
What happens next will not merely determine outcome of a constitutional amendment. It may also define how future generations understand constitutional authority, legislative power, democratic accountability, and rule of law in Sierra Leone.
At moments such as these, strength of a democracy is measured not by absence of disagreement, but by ability of its institutions to resolve disagreement through constitutional means.
That remains the real test before Sierra Leone today.